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Abstract 
 Biased attention for salient negative emotional stimuli is a proposed cognitive 
mechanism of internalizing disorders, namely depression and anxiety. Previous studies 
have demonstrated biases in bottom-up, stimulus-driven attentional systems, as well as 
top-down, goal-oriented attentional systems, in the context of negative emotion. However, 
the underlying cognitive mechanisms that drive these biases, such as attentional control 
deficits, are not well understood. Furthermore, given the high degree of conceptual and 
empirical overlap between depression and anxiety, it is unclear how biased attention 
might relate to constructs common across both disorders, such as general distress, versus 
what is specific to each disorder. The current study utilized an emotional adaptation of 
the Antisaccade Task with eye tracking to precisely and accurately tease apart 
components of attentional control, including inhibition and shifting, in the context of 
social threat (i.e., anger) in a community sample of youth and young adults (ages 13-22; 
N = 80). Findings show that difficulty inhibiting attention for social threat is associated 
with symptoms of general distress, which are shared across depression and anxiety, as 
well as symptoms of physiological hyperarousal that are specific to anxiety. Overall, 
findings further clarify what specific components of attentional control deficits underlie 
biased attentional processing, a well-established cognitive mechanism of internalizing 
disorders.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Depression and anxiety are debilitating internalizing disorders with significant 
implications for cognitive, interpersonal, and occupational functioning, as well as 
physical health (Bistricky, Ingram, & Atchley, 2011). Moreover, the prevalence rates of 
depression and anxiety increase dramatically in mid-to-late adolescence (e.g., Hankin et 
al., 1998, Teubert & Pinquart, 2011). It is therefore critical for research to elucidate 
potential mechanisms of internalizing disorders in youth. The current study investigates 
one well-established cognitive mechanism of both depression and anxiety disorders, 
namely biased attentional processing of negative emotional information. Information 
processing theories maintain that negative attentional biases act as filters for stimuli in 
the environment, affecting the way an individual perceives, evaluates, attends to, and 
remembers emotionally salient information (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010, Joorman & 
Siemer, 2011). It is hypothesized that these negative biases are associated with the onset, 
maintenance, and recurrence of internalizing problems, including depression and anxiety 
(e.g. Beck, 1976, Gibb, McGeary, & Beevers, 2015, Koster, De Lissnyder, Derakshan, & 
De Raedt, 2011). 
Theories of Biased Attentional Processing in Depression and Anxiety   
 Attention is defined as a set of processes that filter incoming information from the 
environment and select relevant information for further downstream processing. First, 
attention facilitates automatic orienting towards salient information, via bottom-up, 
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stimulus-driven systems, especially in the early stages of the information-processing 
stream (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012). Second, attention is responsible for disregarding 
inappropriate and irrelevant information via top-down, goal-oriented systems, mostly in 
the later stages of the information-processing stream (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012; 
Thayer & Lane, 2000). Cognitive theories of internalizing disorders maintain that biased 
attentional processes, which reflect preferential attention for emotionally salient stimuli, 
are putative cognitive mechanisms of depression and anxiety. Biased attentional 
processes are critical because they exert a relatively early impact on an unfolding 
emotional response. In other words, if an emotionally salient stimulus is attended to in the 
environment, it then affects cognitive appraisals of a situation, and ultimately impacts the 
resulting emotional response to the situation.   
 Theories of biased attention in internalizing disorders can be further broken down 
into specific hypotheses regarding patterns of bottom-up and top-down attentional 
processing. For example, biased attention is characterized by the tendency to 
automatically orient attention, during the early stages of information processing, towards 
emotionally salient information in the environment, especially negative information such 
as sadness, anger, or fear (e.g., Beck, 2008). For example, imagine you are giving an oral 
presentation to a group of colleagues. You might, for instance, quickly and immediately 
pick up on the sole person in the audience who is furrowing her eyebrows and frowning.  
 Biased attention is also characterized by problems disregarding emotionally 
salient information in the later stages of information processing, especially if it is 
irrelevant or inappropriate. There are two alternative theories regarding how biases in 
top-down, goal-oriented systems operate. One theory argues that biased attention is 
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characterized by the tendency to direct attention away from a negative emotional stimulus 
once it is automatically detected, a process sometimes referred to as attentional avoidance 
(e.g., Williams, Watts, MacLeod, Matthews, 1988). This theory posits that avoidance 
precludes the opportunity to further assess a negative emotional stimulus and reappraise it 
in a way that mitigates the resulting emotional response. Returning to the earlier example 
of the oral presentation, this theory would suggest that if you quickly and immediately 
orient to the frowning colleague and then subsequently direct your attention away, you 
might make the immediate appraisal that the colleague does not like your presentation, 
leading you to feel nervous or upset. Relatedly, you would miss the opportunity to 
reappraise the colleague’s seemingly negative facial expression as actually reflecting her 
focus and concentration on your presentation.  
 An alternative hypothesis posits that biased attention is instead characterized by 
an inability to direct attention away from a negative emotional stimulus once it is 
automatically detected, which leads to increased maintenance of attention on the negative 
emotional stimulus (e.g., Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo 2007). This theory posits 
that difficulty disengaging not only leads to elaborative processing of the negative 
emotional stimulus, but also precludes the opportunity to detect other critical information 
in the environment that could facilitate an appropriate reappraisal of situation. According 
to this theory, if you quickly and immediately orient to the frowning colleague and have 
difficulty directing your attention away, you might make the appraisal that the colleague 
does not like your presentation, leading you to feel nervous and upset. Furthermore, by 
not directing attention away from the frowning colleague to other parts of the room, you 
would not notice other positive facial expressions in the audience, and would miss the 
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chance to reappraise the situation and recognize that most colleagues in the room are 
probably enjoying your presentation. 
 Taken together, these two theories seem to suggest contradictory pathways by 
which biases in top-down, goal-oriented attention operate as a cognitive mechanism for 
internalizing disorders. One theory suggests that avoidance patterns of attention 
contribute to sustained negative affect, whereas the other theory posits that increased 
maintenance of attention is related to sustained negative affect. Despite these differences, 
both theories share a common component, namely that they both describe difficulties 
effectively directing attention in a top-down, goal-oriented fashion in the context of 
current situational demands. This emphasis on top-down, goal-oriented processing 
mirrors constructs of cognitive control or executive functioning (Miyake & Friedman, 
2012). Cognitive control represents a set of general-purpose cognitive mechanisms that 
help an individual respond to changing environmental demands or make progress towards 
a self-directed goal (Miyake & Friedman, 2012). Cognitive control processes also 
facilitate behavioral and emotional self-regulation, and therefore have important 
implications for cognitive mechanisms of internalizing disorders. According to the 
university/diversity model, three key aspects of cognitive control include shifting, 
inhibition, and updating working memory (Miyake, Friedman, Emerson, Witzki, & 
Howerter, 2000). More specifically, shifting is defined as switching between tasks. 
Inhibition refers to resisting a dominant or prepotent response. Finally, updating is 
defined as replacing task-irrelevant information with newer and more relevant 
information. Although somewhat separable, these cognitive control processes are 
moderately correlated (Miyake et al., 2000).  
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 Deficits in cognitive control processes may underlie difficulties directing attention 
in a top-down, goal-oriented manner in the context of salient emotional stimuli, and 
therefore, may explain seemingly contradictory pathways linking later stages of biased 
attentional processing and internalizing disorders (e.g., for a review in anxiety, see Cisler 
& Koster, 2010, for a review in depression, see Joormann & D’Avanzato, 2010; 
Joormann & Vanderlind, 2014). Studies to date have demonstrated links between broad 
cognitive control deficits and internalizing psychopathology using a variety of methods, 
including self-report questionnaires, traditional neuropsychological tasks, as well as 
adaptations of these neuropsychological tasks with emotionally salient information.  
 More specifically, some studies have examined effortful control, a construct of 
temperament that includes the ability to maintain or shift attentional focus (Eisenberg et 
al., 2005). These studies have shown associations between low levels of effortful control, 
as indexed by self-report questionnaire, and higher levels of anxiety and depression in 
youth (e.g., Muris, van der Pennen, Sigmond, Mayer, 2008) and young adults (Reinholdt-
Dunne, Mogg, & Bradley, 2013). Through the use of self-report questionnaires, such 
studies suggest that an individual’s perceived awareness of cognitive control deficits is 
related to internalizing psychopathology.  
 Other studies have employed neuropsychological tasks to demonstrate links 
between observed cognitive control deficits and internalizing psychopathology. For 
instance, adolescents who exhibited reduced cognitive flexibility, as measured by the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, also showed higher levels of depression and anxiety 
symptoms (Han, Helm, Iucha, Zahn-Waxler, Hastings, & Klimes-Dougan, 2016). A 
similar study showed that children and adolescents who exhibited deficits in working 
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memory (e.g., Digit Span Forward and Backward) and cognitive flexibility (e.g., 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Task) demonstrated higher levels of depression symptoms 
(Evans, Kouros, Samanez-Larkin, & Garber 2015). Finally, some studies have adapted 
traditional neuropsychological tasks with affective stimuli in order to investigate how 
cognitive control deficits in the context of salient emotional information, in particular, 
might be related to internalizing psychopathology. For instance, one study modified the 
n-back working memory task by incorporating emotional distractors, such as fearful and 
happy faces (Ladouceur, Silk, Dahl, Ostapenko, Kronuahs, & Philips, 2009). This study 
found that reduced reaction time in the context of fearful distractors was associated with 
higher levels of anxiety in a sample of children, adolescents, and adults. Another study 
adapted a negative priming task with affective stimuli, namely positive and negative 
words (Joormann, 2004). This study found that reduced reaction time on trials in the 
context of negative words (e.g., sad, ugly) was associated with higher levels of 
depression symptoms in a sample of young adults. Taken together, these findings suggest 
that observed cognitive control deficits, especially in the context salient negative 
emotional information, are related to internalizing psychopathology. 
 Despite a large body of work showing an association between cognitive control 
deficits, broadly speaking, and internalizing psychopathology, it is unclear how these 
cognitive control deficits might manifest in attentional processes, specifically. Moreover, 
no study to date has considered how specific components of cognitive control (i.e., 
inhibition, shifting, and updating) might drive associations between biased attentional 
processing and internalizing psychopathology. Similar to the university/diversity model of 
cognitive control, inhibition of attention refers to resisting a dominant or prepotent urge 
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to direct attention when it is inappropriate or irrelevant in the context of current demands 
(Eysenck et al., 2007). Relatedly, shifting of attention reflects the ability to direct 
attention appropriately in the context of current demands or in service of a self-directed 
goal (Eysenck et al., 2007). Returning to the earlier example of the oral presentation, 
deficits in cognitive control might make it difficult to inhibit a prepotent urge to direct 
attention towards the face of the frowning colleague. Similarly, deficits in cognitive 
control might contribute to problems shifting attention away from the seemingly negative 
facial expression once it becomes the focus of attention. Taken together, deficits in 
cognitive control processes, especially in the context of top-down, goal-directed attention, 
may underlie various patterns of biased attentional processing in depression and anxiety. 
Throughout this paper, this will be referred to simply as deficits in attentional control 
(Posner & Rothbart, 2000, Eysneck et a., 2007).  
Limitations of Prior Work  
 Despite theoretical accounts linking deficits in attentional control to biased 
attention, and ultimately, depression and anxiety, prior studies have not been able to 
sufficiently test these hypotheses due to key methodological limitations. One key 
limitation is that experimental tasks that assess biased attentional processes are not 
designed to index attentional control, broadly speaking, as well as specific components of 
attentional control, such as inhibition or shifting. Rather, previous studies have 
overwhelmingly used the visual dot probe and spatial cueing tasks, which cannot tease 
apart bottom-up, stimulus-driven attention from top-down, goal-oriented attention in the 
context of salient emotional stimuli. In addition, these paradigms only provide a snapshot 
of attention at one moment in an experimental trial, and cannot assess how attention 
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unfolds over time. The current study assessed inhibition and shifting components of 
attentional control using a rigorous experimental paradigm with eye-tracking 
methodology in order to tease apart putative processes of bottom-up, stimulus driven 
attention from top-down, goal-oriented attention in the context of negative emotional 
information.  
 A second key limitation refers to how depression and anxiety have been indexed 
in past research. The preponderance of studies to date has used case-control designs 
comparing healthy controls to participants with DSM-defined depression or anxiety 
disorders. This approach ignores the striking comorbidity between these two internalizing 
disorders, as well as the fact that depression and anxiety share many features in common. 
The current study therefore examined internalizing psychopathology according to the 
Tripartite Model (Watson, Clark, Weber, Assenheimer, Strauss, & McCormick, 1995) by 
identifying what is common across depression and anxiety, namely symptoms of general 
distress, as well as what is specific to each disorder (i.e., anhedonia in depression, 
physiological hyperarousal in anxiety).  
Methodological Limitations in the Study of Attentional Control.  
 One of the most common methods to assess attentional biases is the visual probe 
task (Gibb, McGeary, & Beevers 2015). In each trial of the visual probe task, two stimuli 
(e.g., an emotional and a neutral face) are presented simultaneously on a computer screen 
for a given amount of time (e.g., 500ms or 1000ms). Participants respond as quickly as 
possible to a probe stimulus that replaces either the emotional or neutral face; faster 
response reaction time indicates preferential attention to the facial expression replaced by 
the probe. A similar, but less common method, is an emotional variant of the Posner 
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spatial cueing task. In the spatial cueing task, only one stimulus (i.e., either an emotional 
or neutral face) is presented, and participants respond as quickly as possible to a probe 
stimulus that appears on the same side of the screen as the face (i.e., “valid” trails), or on 
the opposite side of the screen (i.e., “invalid” trials) (see Gibb, McGeary, & Beevers 
2015).  
Essentially, the visual probe task and the spatial cueing task are only able capture 
the focus of attention at one point in time (i.e. the offset of the facial expression 
immediately before the presentation of the probe stimulus) (Gibb, McGeary, Beevers, 
2015). Consequently, the duration of the facial stimulus presentation has important 
implications for which type of attentional process is likely being indexed at the offset of 
the facial stimulus. If facial stimulus is presented for a relatively short period of time (e.g., 
250-500ms), then it can be inferred that tasks are roughly capturing early stages of 
attentional processing, such as bottom-up, stimulus-driven attention, but also potentially 
top-down, goal-oriented attention. However, if face stimulus is presented for a longer 
duration (e.g., 1000ms), then these tasks are potentially indexing aspects of attention that 
occur at later stages of processing, namely top-down, goal-oriented attention. The 
methodological parameters of the visual probe and spatial cueing tasks therefore affect 
the types of conclusions that can be made about how particular components of biased 
attentional processing are related to anxiety and depression.  
For instance, studies investigating attentional biases in anxiety have typically 
presented a facial stimulus for relatively short periods of time (e.g., 500ms). Most studies 
have found greater bias for threat, as indexed by faster response reaction times for probes 
replacing facial displays of anger or fear, in adults diagnosed with anxiety disorders, as 
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well as at-risk adults who score high on self-report questionnaires of state or trait anxiety 
(for a review, see Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & Van 
IJzendoorn, 2007, Cisler & Koster, 2010), therefore concluding that biased attentional 
processing in anxiety is characterized by an increased tendency to orient attention 
towards threatening information (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). Tasks with such a short 
stimulus presentation time cannot, however, answer questions about later stages of top-
down, goal oriented attentional processing. Studies investigating attentional biases in 
anxiety that have presented a facial stimulus for relatively longer periods of time (e.g., 
1000ms, 1250ms) have produced mixed findings. Some of these studies have found 
greater bias for threat at longer presentation times, thus suggesting increased maintenance 
of attention on threatening information in anxiety at later stages of attentional processing 
(e.g., Hankin, Gibb, Abela, & Flory, 2010). However, other studies have failed to find a 
bias at these longer presentation times, therefore concluding that biased attention in 
anxiety is characterized by attentional avoidance of threatening information at later stages 
of processing (e.g., Mogg, Bradley, Miles, & Dixon, 2004). 
 Studies of attentional biases in depression, on the other hand, have largely failed 
to find biases for negative emotional information, such as sadness or anger, when a 
stimulus is presented for 500ms (e.g. Mogg, Bradley, & Williams, 1995), thus suggesting 
that biased attentional processing in depression is not characterized by a greater tendency 
to orient attention towards negative emotion. Instead, studies have found biases for 
sadness and anger when a stimulus is presented for at least 1000ms (see Peckham, 
McHugh, & Otto, 2010). Prior research has found attention biases to sad faces in 
formerly and currently depressed adults (e.g., Joormann and Gotlib, 2007) and youth (e.g., 
 11 
Hankin et. al, 2010), as well as never-disordered offspring of depressed mothers, who are 
at risk for depression (e.g., Joormann, Talbot, & Gotlib, 2007; Kujawa, et al., 2011). 
These findings thus suggest that depression is primarily characterized by increased 
maintenance of attention on negative emotional information at later stages of processing 
(see Gibb, McGeary, & Beevers, 2015, Peckham et al., 2010). 
Although the visual probe and spatial cueing tasks can potentially tease apart 
biased attentional processing based on early and late-stages of the information-processing 
stream, these tasks have two important limitations. The first limitation is these tasks are 
not specifically designed to tease apart bottom-up, stimulus-driven attention from top-
down, goal-oriented attention. Furthermore, these tasks cannot separate top-down, goal-
oriented attention into even more discrete, but meaningful components, namely inhibition 
and shifting of attention (Eysenck et al., 2007). Instead, these tasks merely provide a 
snapshot of attention at one particular point in time. In order to stringently test 
components of attentional process in the context of salient emotional stimuli, an 
experimental task must separate bottom-up, stimulus-driven attention from top-down, 
goal-oriented attention.  
One such task is the Antisaccade Task (e.g., Friedman, Miyake, Young, DeFries, 
Corley, & Hewitt, 2008), a well-established paradigm from the attention literature that is 
purposely designed to tease apart bottom-up, stimulus driven attention from top-down, 
goal-oriented attention. In the prosaccade condition, participants are instructed to look at 
a cue that flashes on one side of the screen, and identify a number that replaces the cue. 
The prosaccade condition therefore indexes automatic, bottom-up, orienting towards a 
salient stimulus in the early stages of information processing. In the antisaccade condition, 
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the number appears on the opposite side of the screen as the cue, and so participants must 
not only inhibit the automatic tendency to orient towards the cue, but also shift attention 
in the opposite direction of the cue. The antisaccade condition therefore not only indexes 
goal-oriented, top-down attentional control in the context of a salient stimulus in the later 
stages of information-processing, but further separates inhibition and shifting of top-
down, goal-oriented attention. Recent studies have created emotional adaptations of the 
Antisaccade Task, using affective (e.g., happy, sad, and angry) and neutral facial stimuli 
in place of the cue. Studies with anxious (e.g., Derakshan, Ansari, Hansard, Shoker, & 
Eysenck, 2009), depressed (e.g., Smyrnis et al., 2003), dysphoric (e.g., Derkashan, Salt, 
& Koster, 2009) adults have found evidence for reduced attentional control in emotional 
adaptations of the Antisaccade Task. The few studies investigating anxious or depressed 
youth samples have also demonstrated reduced attentional control (e.g., Hardin, Mandell, 
Mueller, Dahl, Pine, & Ernst, 2009; Mueller et al., 2012).  
A second limitation of the visual probe and spatial cueing tasks is that they can 
only provide a single snapshot of attention within an ongoing stream of information 
processing. Recent studies of biased attentional processing have begun to utilize eye-
tracking methodology, which provides a continuous measure of many components of 
attentional processing, as measurements are taken frequently (e.g. every 16ms) 
(Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012). Eye movement data overcomes the methodological 
limitations of the visual probe and spatial cueing task in its ability to help to index 
attentional processing across an entire trial, instead of only at one moment in time. In 
addition, eye movement data can separate spatial and temporal components of attention, 
including where attention is directed, as well as when and for how long (Armstrong & 
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Olatunji, 2012). Bottom-up, automatic orienting towards a salient emotional stimulus in 
the early stages of processing can be indexed in event-related ways, such as the 
proportion of initial fixations or latency to initial fixation on an emotional stimulus 
(Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012). Automatic orienting can also be indexed according to 
temporal domains, such as the number of fixations or average fixation duration within the 
first 500ms of a trial. Top-down, goal-oriented direction of attention in the later stages of 
processing, on the other hand, is typically measured by total number of fixations or 
fixation duration across the length of an experimental trial (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012). 
 Findings using eye-tracking methodology have mostly corroborated those of 
visual probe and spatial cueing tasks. A meta-analysis of eye-tracking studies in 
depression and anxiety (i.e., high trait-level and clinical diagnosis) by Armstrong & 
Olatunji (2012) found support for automatic orienting towards threatening information in 
anxiety, but not depression. In addition, this meta-analysis found mixed evidence for the 
later stages of attentional processing in anxiety, with some studies finding avoidance of 
attention on threatening information, and others finding increased maintenance of 
attention. Studies in depression largely showed support for increased maintenance of 
attention towards sadness (Armstrong & Olatinji, 2012).  
Methodological Limitations in the Study of Internalizing Psychopathology.   
The preponderance of research to date has examined links between attentional 
processing and specific forms of internalizing psychopathology using case-control 
designs comparing healthy controls to participants with DSM-defined depression or 
anxiety disorders, with very few studies incorporating comorbid diagnostic groups (see 
Hankin et al., 2010 for an exception). However, large-scale epidemiological studies show 
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a striking comorbidity among depression and anxiety disorders (Avenevoli, Stolar, Li, 
Dierker, & Ries Merikangas, 2001; Garber & Weersing, 2010; Yorbik, Birmaher, 
Axelson, Williamson, & Ryan, 2004). Reviews have estimated that about 15-75% of 
youth with a depression diagnosis also carry a comorbid anxiety diagnosis. Relatedly, 
about 10-15% of youth with an anxiety diagnosis are also diagnosed with depression (e.g., 
Avenevoli et al., 2001; Garber & Weersing, 2010; Yorbik et al., 2004). Moreover, self-
report measures of depression and anxiety symptoms are moderately to highly correlated 
in both clinical and nonclinical samples (r = .45-75; Watson et al., 1995; r = .50-.70; 
Brady & Kendall, 1992).  
One explanation for the strong correlation among constructs of depression and 
anxiety is the overlap of symptoms across both disorders (Watson et al., 1995). For 
example, major depression and generalized anxiety disorder share several symptom 
criteria, including irritability, insomnia, fatigue, restlessness, or difficulty concentration. 
It may be the case that correlations among self-report measures are inflated because these 
overlapping symptoms appear in both depression and anxiety scales. However, there is 
still a substantial intercorrelation among constructs even if overlapping symptom items 
are removed from both measures (r = .34; Clark & Watson, 1991, Stark & Laurent, 2001). 
Researchers have therefore concluded that the strong interrelation among depression and 
anxiety may reflect an underlying shared variance (Seligman & Ollendick, 1998, Watson 
et al., 1995).  
 The Tripartite Model of anxiety and depression is one model that seeks to explain 
the theoretical and empirical interrelation among anxiety and depression. This model 
posits that anxiety and depression share symptoms in common, namely high levels of 
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negative affect. Negative affect is defined as the tendency to feel upset or unpleasantly 
aroused, and includes emotions such as sadness, irritability, anger, guilt, and disgust 
(Watson et al., 1995). In addition, depression and anxiety also share a set of nonspecific 
symptoms, such as irritability, insomnia, fatigue, restlessness, or difficulty concentration 
(e.g. Markon, Krueger, & Watson, 2005). The combination of high levels of negative 
affect and nonspecific symptoms, which are collectively labeled as general distress, 
explain the interrelation between depression and anxiety. At the same time, depression 
and anxiety are also characterized by separate and unique constructs that distinguish the 
two disorders. Depression is specifically characterized by low levels of positive affect, 
which is defined as a lack of interest or low levels of pleasure in daily activities (Watson 
et al., 1995). Low levels of positive affect are also related to feeling tired, fatigued, or 
sluggish. Anxiety, on the other hand, is uniquely described by somatic symptoms of 
tension and arousal, such as shortness of breath, feeling dizzy or lightheaded, or 
trembling and shaking (Watson et al., 1995). Taken together, the Tripartite Model 
hypothesizes that depression is marked by high levels of general distress and low levels 
of positive affect, and anxiety is marked by high levels of general distress and high levels 
of physiological hyperarousal. Empirical support for the Tripartite Model has been found 
in clinical samples of child and adolescent psychiatric inpatients (e.g., Lonigan, Carey, & 
Finch, 1994; Joiner, Catanzaro, & Laurent, 1996), as well as community samples of 
youth (e.g., Stark & Laurent, 2001).  
 Given high levels of empirical and theoretical overlap between depression and 
anxiety disorders, relationships with biased attentional processing may be better 
understood by examining common aspects of internalizing psychopathology, namely 
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general distress, as well as specific components of depression (e.g., anhedonia) or anxiety 
(e.g., physiological hyperarousal). This alternative conceptualization has the potential to 
elucidate a clearer pattern of findings regarding biased attentional processing of negative 
emotional information in internalizing disorders. To our knowledge, no study to date has 
investigated associations between attentional processing and dimensional measures of 
depression and anxiety organized according to the framework of the Tripartite Model.  
The Present Study  
 The current study therefore sought to address two important questions regarding 
biased attentional processing of negative emotional information in youth internalizing 
disorders. First, in light of alternative, and seemingly contradictory pathways by which 
biases in goal-oriented, top-down attentional processes are hypothesized to operate in 
depression and anxiety, the current study sought to test whether deficits in attentional 
control processes may underlie patterns of biased attention. We utilized an emotional 
adaptation of the Antisaccade Task, combined with eye-tracking methodology, to 
precisely and accurately tease apart bottom-up, stimulus driven attention from top-down, 
goal-oriented attention. Moreover, the current study sought to further tease apart top-
down, goal-oriented attention into two distinct components: 1) inhibition of an automatic 
tendency to orient attention towards salient emotional information when it is irrelevant in 
the context of current task goals, and, 2) shifting attention to meet task-relevant goals 
(Hutton & Ettinger, 2006). Previous studies have suggested that deficits in attentional 
control are largely due to difficulties inhibiting attention, as opposed to difficulties 
shifting attention. The first hypothesis was that that greater difficulty inhibiting attention 
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in the context of a salient emotional stimulus, but not shifting attention, would be 
associated with youth internalizing symptoms.   
 Second, given high rates of empirical and theoretical overlap between depression 
and anxiety disorders, the current study sought to investigate whether the relationship 
between biased attentional processing and internalizing psychopathology might be better 
understood by examining associations with common features of depression and anxiety, 
such as general distress, as well as features that are unique to depression (e.g., anhedonia) 
or anxiety (e.g., physiological hyperarousal), in accordance with the Tripartite Model of 
anxiety and depression.  The second hypothesis was that deficits in attentional control, 
namely difficulties inhibiting attention in the context of a negative emotional stimulus, 
would be associated with what is common across depression and anxiety, namely 
symptoms of general distress. In addition, it was hypothesized that these deficits in 
attentional control would be associated with high levels physiological hyperarousal, a 
construct that reflects reactivity to salient stimuli in the environment. Previous studies 
examining hyperarousal via physiological measurements (e.g., skin conductance) have 
found associations with attentional bias for threat (e.g., Carr, Scully, Webb, Felmingham, 
2016; Felmingham, Rennie, Manor, & Bryan, 2011). Finally, it was hypothesized that 
attentional control deficits would not be related to anhedonia, as this construct is typically 
linked to attentional biases for positive, and not negative, emotional information (e.g., 
Peckham et al., 2010). Taken together, the current study offers an alternative 
conceptualization of associations between attentional control deficits and continuous 
symptom domains of general distress, anhedonia, and physiological hyperarousal in order 
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to elucidate cognitive mechanisms of youth internalizing psychopathology (McLaughlin 
& Nolen-Hoeksema, 2011).   
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Chapter Two: Method 
Participants 
 Participants in the present study included 80 adolescents and young adults 
recruited from school districts in metropolitan Denver, Colorado and from the University 
of Denver. Adolescents and young adults were recruited as part of a larger study 
investigating cognitive control and associations with internalizing psychopathology. The 
sample of youth ranged in age from 13 to 22 years old (mean age 16.76 years old, SD 
2.39). The sample was approximately evenly divided by sex (males: 57%, females: 43%), 
and was ethnically and racially representative of the geographic area from which it was 
recruited (Hispanic/Latino: 25%, Caucasian: 50%, African American: 15%, Asian/Pacific 
Islander: 4%, Other/Mixed Race: 6%).  
Procedure 
 As part of the larger study, participants came to the lab in one 6-hour laboratory 
visit, with breaks to reduce fatigue. Youth under age 18 came with one parent, and this 
parent provided informed written consent while the adolescent provided informed written 
assent. Young adults who were over 18 years of age provided informed written consent. 
Adolescents and young adults completed computer tasks to assess attentional control over 
emotional stimuli, and all participants completed questionnaires to assess depression and 
anxiety. The Institutional Review Board approved all procedures. Participants were 
reimbursed for their participation. 
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Measures 
Depression Symptoms.  
The Children’s Depression Inventory (CDI: Kovacs, 1992) is a widely used 
measure of depressive symptoms in children and adolescents and includes 27 items 
consisting of three statements (e.g., I am sad once in a while, I am sad many times, I am 
sad all the time), which are rated on a 0 to 2 Likert scale. A total score, ranging from 0 to 
54, is generated by summing all items, with a higher score indicating higher levels of 
depressive symptoms. The CDI has sound psychometric properties, including good 
reliability and validity (Timbremont, Braet, Dreesen, 2004). Internal consistency () for 
the current study was .89.  
The Center for Epidemiologic Studies-Depression Scale for Children (CES-DC: 
Faulstich, Carey, Ruggiero, Enyart, & Gresham, 1986) is a widely used depression 
inventory for children and adolescents. Each of the 20 items presents a symptom of 
depression (e.g., “I felt lonely, like I didn’t have any friends”) and participants indicate 
how true each item is on a four-point Likert scale ranging from “Not at All” (0) to “A Lot” 
(3). A total score, ranging from 0 to 60, is generated by summing ratings across all items, 
and a higher score indicates higher levels of depressive symptoms. The CES-DC has 
good psychometric properties, including good reliability and validity (Faulstich et al., 
1986). Internal consistency () for the current study was .92.  
Anxiety Symptoms.  
The Multidimensional Anxiety Scale for Children (MASC: March, Parker, 
Sullivan, Stallings, & Conners, 1997) is a widely used measure of anxiety symptoms in 
children and adolescents that contains 39 items assessing physical symptoms of anxiety, 
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harm avoidance, social anxiety, and separation anxiety. Each item presents a symptom of 
anxiety (e.g. “gets scared when parents go away” or “worries about getting called on in 
class”), and participants indicate how true each item is on a four-point Likert scale 
ranging from “Never true” (0) to “Very true” (3). A total score, ranging from 0 to 117, is 
generated by summing all items, with a higher score indicating higher levels of anxious 
symptoms. The MASC has good reliability and validity (Muris et al., 2002). In the 
current study, items in the harm avoidance scale were not included in the total score, as 
previous research has suggested that these items do not load onto latent factors of 
internalizing symptoms (Schneider, Arch, & Hankin, 2016). Therefore, in the current 
study, a total score, ranging from 0 to 90 was calculated. In the current study, internal 
consistency () was .93.  
The Penn State Worry Questionnaire for Children (PSWQ-C; Chorpita, Tracey, 
Brown, Collica, Barlow, 1997) assesses worry in children and adolescents. This scale 
includes 14 statements (e.g., “Many things make me worry”), and participants rate how 
true each statement is on a four-point Likert scale ranging from “Never” (0) to “Always” 
(3). A total score, ranging from 0 to 42, is generated by summing ratings across all items. 
A higher score indicates a greater tendency to worry. The PSWQ-C has good 
psychometric properties, such as convergent validity with related constructs, such as 
anxiety diagnostic status (Pestle, Chorpita, Schiffman, 2008). In the current study, 
internal consistency () was .80. 
Tripartite Model Symptom Constructs. 
For the purpose of the current study, we reassigned items from our depression and 
anxiety symptom questionnaires to new outcome variables reflecting general distress, 
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anhedonia, and physiological hyperarousal (Table 1). Symptoms of general distress were 
selected based on the General Distress subscale from the Mood and Anxiety Symptom 
Questionnaire (MASQ: Watson et al., 1995). The General Distress scale includes 
relatively nonspecific symptoms related to both anxiety and depression disorders, such as 
irritability, difficulty concentrating or making decisions, and fatigue. Internal consistency 
() for General Distress in the current study was .95. Symptoms of anhedonia were 
selected based on the Loss of Interest subscale from the MASQ, as well as prior work 
examining anhedonia scales from depression symptom questionnaires (e.g., Chorpita, 
Albano, & Barlow, 1998), which has been used in previous studies investigating 
anhedonic symptoms of depression (Hankin, 2008; Hankin, Stone, & Wright, 2010). The 
Loss of Interest scale includes symptoms specific to depression disorders, such as 
difficulty findings pleasure or enjoyment in activities, feeling withdrawn from others, and 
trouble getting started with tasks. Internal consistency () for the Anhedonia scale 
was .89. Finally, symptoms of physiological hyperarousal were selected based on the 
Anxious Arousal subscale from the MASQ, as well as prior work examining physical 
symptoms scales from anxiety symptom questionnaires (e.g., March, Parker, Sullivan, 
Stallings, & Conners, 1997). The Anxious Arousal subscale includes items specific to 
anxiety disorders, such as racing or pounding heart, nausea, or trouble getting breath. 
Internal consistency () for the Physiological Hyperarousal Scale was .87. 
Attention.  
 Emotional Antisaccade Task. For the purpose of this study, we developed an 
emotional adaptation of the Antisaccade Task (Friedman et al., 2008). In the Antisaccade 
Task, participants must correctly identify a target number. In the prosaccade condition, a 
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cue (e.g. small black box) flashes on one side of the screen, and the target number flashes 
on the same side of the screen and is masked after 150ms. In the prosaccade condition, 
participants are instructed to look at the same side of the screen as the cue and to say the 
number out loud to the experimenter, who enters the response. The prosaccade condition 
thus measures an automatic tendency to saccade to the cue. In the antisaccade condition, 
the target number flashes on the opposite side of the screen and is masked after 150ms. In 
the antisaccade condition, participants are instructed to look at the opposite side of the 
screen as the cue and to say the number out loud. The antisaccade condition thus 
measures the inhibition of an automatic tendency to saccade to the cue, as well as the 
ability to shift attention toward the opposite side of the screen as the cue. The 
Antisaccade Task therefore not only isolates bottom-up, stimulus-driven systems of 
attention (i.e., in the prosaccade condition) but also separates these systems from top-
down, goal-directed systems of attention (i.e., in the antisaccade condition). Several other 
versions of the antisaccade task have also been used in studies of attention and 
psychopathology. For instance, some tasks have used a mixed-block design (e.g., De 
Lissnyder, Derakshan, de Raedt, & Koster, 2011), which requires participants to switch 
between prosaccades and antisaccades across experimental trials, thereby increasing 
cognitive load. Other tasks have included reward and punishment conditions (e.g., Jazbec, 
McClure, Hardin, Pine, & Ernst, 2005) to examine the influence of motivational systems 
on attention. The focus of the current study was to tease apart bottom-up, stimulus-driven 
systems of attention, as well as top-down, goal-directed systems of attention, and so we 
chose to adapt the Antisaccade Task by Friedman and colleagues because it offered the 
most stringent design to test the hypotheses of the current study.   
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 In our emotional adaptation, the cue (e.g. small black box) was replaced by an 
emotional face (e.g. neutral, angry) (Figure 1). The task consisted of 204 total trials, 
divided into three conditions, with two blocks per condition. Trials were presented in a 
fixed randomized order to each participant in order to maximize the ability to detect 
individual differences across participants. In the prosaccade condition, participants 
practiced on 12 trials and then received 60 target trials. In the antisaccade condition, 
participants practiced on 12 trials and then received 60 target trials. This adapted task 
also had an additional antisaccade condition consisting of 60 target trials, which was 
exploratory, and so therefore was not included in the analysis of the current study. Each 
trial began with a fixation cross in the center of the screen for a variable amount of time 
(i.e., one of nine times between 1500 ms and 3500 ms in 250ms intervals). In the 
prosaccade condition, a face stimulus cue then appeared on one side of the screen for 
175ms, followed by a number inside of an open square on the same side of the screen for 
175ms. In the antisaccade condition, a face stimulus cue then appeared on one side of the 
screen for 233ms, followed by a number inside of an open square on the opposite side of 
the screen for 175ms. The number was then masked with gray cross-hatching, and the 
mask remained on the screen until the participant identified the number out loud to the 
experimenter, who entered the number on the keyboard.  
 The face stimuli for the two experimental tasks were colored photographs of 
males and females from the NIMSTIM face set (Tottenham et. al., 2009). Twenty-four 
faces (12 female) were selected; 12 were Caucasian, 6 were Asian/other, and 6 were 
African American. Each face was shown in both a closed-mouth neutral and open-mouth 
angry expression, totaling 48 face stimuli. Stimuli were presented on a Tobii T120 
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infrared eye-tracker monitor (Tobii Technology, Stockholm, Sweden) using E-prime 
Professional Version 22. Participants sat at a distance of approximately 60 cm away from 
the computer monitor (17” TFT monitor, 1280 x 1024 pixel resolution). The Tobii T120 
eye tracker recorded gaze data of both eyes at 60 Hz with an average accuracy of 0.5o 
visual angle. The gaze data was calibrated using a nine-point calibration procedure prior 
to the task. Experimenters repeated calibration for missing or poorly assessed calibration 
points before proceeding with the experimental tasks. Left and right eye gaze positions 
were recorded separately and averaged to determine gaze position.  
 Raw eye movement data was analyzed using Tobii Studio software. Fixations 
were defined as at least 100 ms of looking within a 50-pixel radius. Three unique areas of 
interest were identified during the presentation of the facial stimulus cue (Figure 2). In 
the prosaccade condition, an area of interest was drawn on the face stimulus cue. In the 
antisaccade condition, an area of interest was also drawn on the facial stimulus cue. 
Finally, in the antisaccade condition, only, an area of interest was drawn on the opposite 
side of the screen, in the location where a number inside of an open square would appear 
at the offset of the facial cue. This area of interest was defined as the target location.  
Areas of interest were divided into two separate groups based on the type facial 
cue (i.e., angry, neutral) presented in the trial. One variable of interest was proportion of 
reflexive prosaccades, which was defined by the proportion of trials in the antisaccade 
condition in which a fixation was made on the face stimulus cue. Two proportions of 
reflexive prosaccades were calculated: for the angry and neutral facial cues in the 
antisaccade condition. A second variable of interest for the current study was time to first 
fixation, which was defined as the time elapsed between the onset of the face stimulus 
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cue and the first fixation on an area of interest. Six time to first fixation variables were 
calculated: for the angry and neutral facial cues in the prosaccade condition, the angry 
and neutral facial cues in the antisaccade condition, and the target location in the context 
of angry and neutral facial cues in the antisaccade condition.  
Statistical Power 
Power analyses conducted with G*Power3 showed that power to detect effect 
sizes of 0.1 (i.e., R2) was 80%, power to detect effect sizes of .075 was 67%, and power 
to detect effect sizes of .05 was 50% ( = 0.05) (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007).  
Data Analytic Strategy 
 Multivariate regressions were conducted to assess the relationship between 
indices of attentional orienting and attentional control and symptoms of general distress, 
anhedonia, and anxious arousal. All analyses included age and gender as covariates. 
Attentional orienting was indexed in the prosaccade condition in two ways. First, 
attentional orienting was indexed by subtracting percentage of correctly identified 
numbers in the context of neutral facial cues from the percentage of correctly identified 
numbers in the context of angry cues. A positive difference score would indicate greater 
accuracy for angry versus neutral facial cues, and thus would suggest greater attentional 
orienting towards angry facial cues as compared to neutral facial cues in the prosaccade 
condition. A negative difference score would index reduced accuracy for angry versus 
neutral facial cues, and thus reduced attentional orienting towards angry versus neutral 
cues.  
Second, attentional orienting was indexed by subtracting the time to first fixation 
towards neutral facial cues from time to first fixation towards angry facial cues. The use 
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of difference scores to examine attentional processing of emotional versus neutral 
information has been widely used, such as in calculating attentional bias scores for 
emotion in the modified dot probe task (Mogg et al., 1995). A positive difference score 
would indicate a longer latency to orient towards angry facial cues relative to neutral 
facial cues. A negative difference score would indicate a shorter latency to orient towards 
angry relative to neutral cues, and thus would thus index greater attentional orienting 
towards angry facial cues as compared to neutral facial cues in the prosaccade condition.  
 Attentional control was indexed in the antisaccade condition in four ways. This is 
because the execution of correct antisaccades is hypothesized to reflect two separate 
processes: 1) inhibition of an incorrect reflexive prosaccade towards the cue and, 2) 
generation of a correct antisaccade towards the target location (Hutton & Ettinger, 2006), 
which will be referred to as shifting of attention. Studies suggest that antisaccade errors 
are largely due to difficulties inhibiting a reflexive prosaccade, as opposed to difficulties 
generating a correct antisaccade (Hutton & Ettinger, 2006).  
 We indexed inhibition of a reflexive prosaccade towards the cue in two ways. 
First, inhibition was indexed by subtracting the proportion of reflexive prosaccades 
towards neutral facial cues from the proportion of reflexive prosaccades towards angry 
facial cues. A positive difference would indicate a greater proportion of incorrect 
reflexive prosaccades in the context of angry facial cues as compared to neutral facial 
cues, and thus reduced inhibition in the context of angry as compared to neutral facial 
cues. A negative difference would indicate a smaller proportion reflexive prosaccades in 
the context of angry as compared to neutral facial cues. Second, inhibition was indexed 
by subtracting time to first fixation for the neutral facial cues from the time to first 
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fixation for the angry facial cues. A positive difference score would indicate a longer 
latency to fixate on the angry cues relative to neutral cues, and thus would suggest 
relatively greater inhibition in the context of angry as compared to neutral facial cues. A 
negative difference would indicate a shorter latency to fixate on angry relative to neutral 
facial cues, and would thus suggest reduced inhibition in the context of angry versus 
neutral facial cues. 
 We indexed shifting of attention towards the target location in two ways. First, 
shifting was indexed by subtracting percentage of correctly identified numbers in the 
context of neutral facial cues from the percentage of correctly identified numbers in the 
context of angry cues. A positive difference score would indicate greater accuracy in the 
context angry versus neutral facial cues, and thus would index greater shifting of 
attention in the context of angry versus neutral cues. A negative difference score would 
index reduced accuracy in the context of angry versus neutral facial cues, and thus would 
index reduced shifting of attention in the context of angry cues versus neutral cues. 
Second, successful generation of antisaccades was indexed by subtracting time to first 
fixation for the target location in the context of neutral facial cues from the time to first 
fixation for the target location in the context of angry facial cues. A positive difference 
score would indicate a longer latency to fixate on the target location in the context of 
angry cues relative to neutral cues, and thus would index reduced shifting of attention in 
the context of angry as compared to neutral facial cues. A negative difference would 
indicate a shorter latency to fixate on the target location in the context of angry relative to 
neutral facial cues. 
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 Because outliers have the potential to distort analyses, all extreme values were 
windsorized to less extreme values (Lipsey and Wilson 2001). More specifically, outliers 
that were more than three standard deviations from the mean were recoded to the value at 
three standard deviations from the mean.  
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Chapter Three: Results 
Preliminary Data Analysis  
Means, standard deviations, and inter-correlations for all variables are shown in 
Table 2.   
A manipulation check was conducted to determine the effect of experimental 
condition (e.g., prosaccade versus antisaccade) on behavioral accuracy. More specifically, 
behavioral accuracy should be higher in the prosaccade condition because it is easier than 
the antisaccade condition. A paired-samples t-test determined that behavioral accuracy 
was higher in the prosaccade condition (M = 0.99, SD = 0.02) as compared to the 
antisaccade condition (M = 0.93 , SD = 0.07 ); t (77) = 7.51, p < .001), thus reflecting a 
successful experimental manipulation. 
Attentional Orienting 
 Percentage of correctly identified numbers for angry versus neutral facial cues in 
the prosaccade condition was not associated with symptoms of general distress, 
anhedonia, or anxious arousal (Table 3). Time to first fixation for angry versus neutral 
facial cues in the prosaccade condition was also not associated with symptoms of general 
distress, anhedonia, or anxious arousal (Table 4). This suggests that bottom-up, stimulus-
driven systems of attention do not underlie biased attentional processing of negative 
emotional information in internalizing psychopathology.  
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Attentional Control  
 In terms of inhibition of reflexive prosaccades towards the facial cue, proportion 
of reflexive prosaccades towards angry versus neutral facial cues was not associated with 
symptoms of general distress, anhedonia, or anxious arousal (Table 5). This suggests that 
symptoms of internalizing psychopathology are not necessarily associated with a 
tendency to make more incorrect reflexive prosaccades in the context of angry versus 
neutral cues. However, time to first fixation for angry versus neutral cues was negatively 
associated with symptoms of general distress (β= -.264, t(74) = -2.605, p < .05) (Figure 3, 
Table 6) and symptoms of anxious arousal (β= -.302, t(77) = -2.795, p < .05) (Figure 4, 
Table 6), meaning that general distress and physiological hyperarousal were associated 
with a tendency to make incorrect reflexive prosaccades more quickly in the context of 
angry versus neutral facial cues. Time to first fixation for angry versus neutral facial cues 
was not associated with symptoms of anhedonia (β= -.185, t(73) = -1.570, p = .121). 
Taken together, these results show support for the theory that reduced inhibition of a 
prepotent tendency to direct attention towards irrelevant negative emotional stimuli is 
associated with what is common across depression and anxiety, namely symptoms of 
general distress, as well as symptoms of physiological hyperarousal specific to anxiety.  
 In terms of shifting attention towards the target location, percentage of correctly 
identified numbers for angry versus neutral facial cues in the antisaccade condition was 
not associated with symptoms of general distress, anhedonia, or anxious arousal (Table 7). 
In addition, time to first fixation for the target location in the context of angry versus 
neutral facial cues was not associated with symptoms of general distress, anhedonia, or 
anxious arousal (Table 8). Taken together, these results suggest that symptoms of 
 32 
internalizing psychopathology are not related to difficulties shifting attention towards the 
target location in the context of angry versus neutral cues. Therefore, the results of the 
current study suggest that reduced attentional control for angry versus neutral facial 
stimuli is specifically linked to difficulties inhibiting attention, as opposed to difficulties 
shifting attention, in the context of salient negative emotional stimuli.  
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Chapter Four: Discussion 
 Cognitive theories of internalizing disorders (e.g., Williams et al., 1988) have 
long proposed that biased attention for salient emotional stimuli is associated with 
internalizing psychopathology, including anxiety and depression. However, the precise 
attentional mechanisms responsible for these biases have not been well explicated, as 
very few studies have investigated how attentional control deficits drive biases in 
directing top-down, goal-oriented attention in the context of salient emotional stimuli. 
Furthermore, the affective symptom specificity of these attentional mechanisms has also 
been unclear due to strong overlap between measures of depression and anxiety. No study 
to date has tested how attentional control deficits might be linked to constructs common 
to both disorders, namely symptoms of general distress, as well as those symptom 
constructs that are putatively more specific to each disorder, including anhedonia and 
physiological hyperarousal. By using an experimental attentional control task with eye 
tracking methods to predict symptom constructs from the tripartite model of depression 
and anxiety, results showed that deficits in attentional control, as indexed by difficulty 
inhibiting a prepotent tendency to direct attention towards social threat, is associated with 
higher levels of general distress and physiological hyperarousal in youth and young 
adults. In contrast, no significant associations were observed with initial automatic 
orienting towards social threat, or with shifting attention in the context of social threat. In 
summary, the current study teased apart components of attention and answered detailed 
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and specific questions about how attentional control deficits affect biased attentional 
processing and associations with internalizing symptoms.  
 These results provide evidence suggesting that deficits in attentional control, 
specifically deficits in inhibition of attention, might be a core cognitive control process 
that underlies biased top-down, goal-oriented attention in the context of negative emotion 
and its association with internalizing symptoms of anxiety and depression. A large body 
of research in the anxiety and depression literatures has found biases for salient negative 
emotional information in the later stages of information processing (e.g., for reviews, see 
Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Peckham et al., 2010), with some suggesting that these biases 
reflect attentional avoidance (e.g., Williams, et al., 1988), whereas others have suggested 
that these biases reflect increased maintenance of attention on negative emotion (e.g., 
Eysenck et al., 2007). Results from the current study suggest that difficulties inhibiting a 
prepotent tendency to direct attention towards salient negative emotional stimuli, 
especially when it is irrelevant or inappropriate, may be a critical component of 
attentional control that operates as a cognitive mechanism for depression and anxiety.   
 Findings are further strengthened by the use of rigorous experimental paradigms 
combined with eye-tracking methodology to more precisely and accurately index 
attention via event and temporal-related parameters. Using multiple indicators of 
attention (e.g., time to first fixation, number of fixations), on multiple areas of interest 
(e.g., facial cue location and target location), parsed apart components of attention, 
including bottom-up, stimulus-driven automatic orienting of attention, as well as top-
down, goal-oriented inhibition and shifting of attention. Such a fine-grained approach 
facilitated the investigation of how particular aspects of attentional control might be 
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related to biased attentional processing. First, high levels of general distress and 
physiological hyperarousal were associated with difficulties inhibiting a prepotent 
tendency to direct attention towards social threat. This deficit was observed via decreased 
latency to make reflexive prosaccades towards angry faces, however, not via proportion 
of reflexive prosaccades. This reduced latency suggests deficits inhibiting the automatic 
tendency to direct attention towards salient emotional stimuli, especially when it is 
irrelevant. In addition, the current study did not find evidence for difficulties shifting 
attention away from social threat, as indexed by latency to make correct antisaccades 
toward the target location. Therefore, general distress and physiological hyperarousal 
may not be associated with the components of attentional control that eventually correct 
for this inhibition deficit and shift attention to meet task-relevant goals.  
 Findings from the current study may help to clarify a mixed picture of how 
patterns of biased top-down, goal-oriented attention may operate as a cognitive 
mechanism for internalizing disorders. Deficits inhibiting a prepotent tendency to direct 
attention towards negative emotional information, especially when it is irrelevant or 
inappropriate, have crucial implications for downstream cognitive processing. Most 
importantly, this irrelevant emotional information enters into working memory 
(Joormann & Vanderlind, 2014). Working memory is a limited-capacity system that 
temporarily stores and manipulates information in the service of current cognitive 
processes (Friedman & Miyake, 2004). Irrelevant negative emotional information that 
enters into working memory may interfere with the ability to effectively respond to 
changing environmental demands or make progress towards a self-directed goal 
(Joormann & Vanderlind, 2014; Miyake & Friedman, 2012). Returning to the earlier 
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example of the oral presentation, difficulty inhibiting attention towards the colleague that 
is frowning and furrowing her eyebrows would lead to this negative emotional 
information entering into working memory. Regardless of whether you immediately 
direct your attention away from, or alternatively, maintain your attention on the face of 
the frowning colleague, it is still the case that irrelevant negative emotional information 
has now entered working memory. In other words, regardless of the overt allocation of 
attention after the frowning face has become the focus of attention, it maybe the case that 
covert processing of the irrelevant content in working memory occurs (Cisler & Koster, 
2010). Irrelevant content in working memory would therefore lead to negative appraisals 
of the situation, such that the colleague does not like your presentation, leading you to 
feel nervous and upset (Joormann & Vanderlind, 2014). By taking into account the 
greater literature on how cognitive control processes impact an unfolding response, the 
results of the current study therefore illustrate how difficulties inhibiting attention for 
irrelevant or inappropriate negative emotional information is related to sustained negative 
affect, regardless of whether subsequent avoidance of attention or increased maintenance 
of attention occurs.  
 In addition to offering a potential explanation of a seemingly mixed picture of 
findings in the literature on biased attention, the current study also provides a 
theoretically-informed conceptualization of how biased attention is related to what is 
common and shared across dimensional constructs of depression and anxiety, namely 
symptoms of general distress. Most studies examining biased attentional processing have 
utilized case-control designs comparing healthy controls to participants with DSM-
defined depression or anxiety disorders, with few studies investigating comorbid groups. 
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Although these studies have demonstrated relationships between biased attentional 
processing and anxiety on the one hand, and depression on the other hand, this approach 
ignores the theoretical and empirical comorbidity between these two types of 
internalizing disorders (Watson et al., 1995). Results from the current study demonstrate 
that deficits in attentional control are indeed associated with constructs that are shared 
across anxiety and depression, namely negative affect, as well as nonspecific symptoms 
such as fatigue or difficulty concentrating. In addition, deficits in attentional control are 
also associated with physiological hyperarousal. High levels of physiological 
hyperarousal might reflect greater bottom-up affective reactivity to salient environmental 
stimuli (Rothbart & Rueda, 2005), such as social threat, which may make it difficult for 
top-down, goal-oriented attention to successfully override the influence of bottom-up 
behavioral and physiological systems and direct attention in the context of situational 
demands or in the service of a self-directed goal. Taken together, our findings therefore 
provide an alternative, and potentially more organized approach to conceptualizing how 
biased attentional processing might relate to both shared and unique constructs of anxiety 
and depression.   
 The finding that deficits in attentional control was not associated with anhedonia 
is consistent with expected cognitive, emotional, and behavioral sequelae linked to 
anhedonia, a construct that is specific to depression, and not anxiety. Anhedonia is 
associated with low levels of positive affectivity, reduced approach towards motivating or 
reinforcing stimuli, and diminished energy and activity. Relatedly, studies of attentional 
bias in depression have largely found that depression, but not anxiety, is associated with 
reduced attention for positive emotional stimuli, such as facial displays of happiness (e.g., 
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Peckham et al., 2010). It therefore may be the case that the specific symptom construct of 
anhedonia is not related to attentional control deficits in the context of negative emotional 
stimuli, namely social threat. It is likely that future studies that incorporate both positive 
and negative emotional stimuli in tasks indexing attention control might find associations 
between specific constructs of anhedonia and positive stimuli.   
Relation to Previous Literature on Attentional Control Deficits  
Very few studies have investigated attentional control processing in youth with 
internalizing disorders. Some studies have administered emotional adaptations of the 
Antisaccade Task, including both affective (e.g., happy, angry, sad, fearful) and neutral 
faces as cues. A study by Mueller and colleagues (2012) compared anxious youth (i.e., 
diagnosed with General Anxiety Disorder, Social Phobia, and Separation Anxiety 
Disorder) to healthy controls in a mixed-block emotional antisaccade task with affective 
(e.g., happy, angry, fearful) and neutral faces. This study found that anxious youth 
demonstrated a shorter latency to orient to angry faces in the prosaccade condition, which 
was not found in the current study. However, consistent with the current study, Mueller 
and colleagues did not find that anxiety was associated with proportion of reflexive 
prosaccades or latency to fixate on the target location in the context of affective versus 
neutral faces. In contrast, a study by Derakshan and colleagues (2009) compared 
dysphoric adults (i.e., BDI-II scores > 13) to non-dysphoric young adults (i.e., BDI-II 
scores < 5) on an emotional antisaccade task with affective (e.g., happy, angry) and 
neutral faces. This task include standard versions of the prosaccade and antisaccade 
conditions, as well as delayed versions of the prosaccade and antisaccade condition, in 
which participants were instructed to make saccades only after an 800 ms delay. This 
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study found that dysphoric young adults exhibited higher rates of erroneous reflexive 
prosaccades, which was not consistent with the current study. However, the study by 
Derakshan and colleagues found that dysphoria was not associated with latency to fixate 
on the target location, which corroborates findings in the current study.  
Other studies examining attentional control in youth with internalizing 
psychopathology have administered versions of the Antisaccade Task that utilize reward 
and punishment conditions, but do not include affective and neutral facial stimuli in place 
of the cue. For instance, Jazbec et al., (2005) compared anxious (i.e., diagnosed with 
General Anxiety Disorder, Social Phobia, and Separation Anxiety Disorder) and 
depressed (i.e., diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder) adolescents on a mixed-block 
design task with monetary rewards and punishments. In this task, the initial fixation in the 
center of the screen indicated the opportunity for monetary gain or loss in the trial. This 
study also did not find that anxiety or depression diagnosis was associated with 
proportion of reflexive prosaccades in the antisaccade condition. Finally, Hardin et al., 
(2007) utilized a similar Antisaccade Task in anxious (i.e., diagnosed with an anxiety 
disorder) and depressed (i.e., diagnosed with Major Depressive Disorder) adolescents. 
This task was different from the one utilized by Jazbec and colleagues in that it only 
included antisaccade trials. This study found that depressed adolescents demonstrated a 
greater proportion of reflexive prosaccades in the antisaccade condition. Taken together, 
the results of the current study add to previous studies in depressed and anxious 
adolescents and young adults showing deficits attentional control, even though studies 
vary according to what particular indicator (i.e., latency of saccades, proportion of 
reflexive prosaccades) reflects deficits in attentional control. Moreover, it should be 
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noted that there are important methodological differences between previous research and 
the current study. For instance, the small body of studies has largely compared healthy 
controls to those with DSM-defined depression or anxiety disorders, and the current 
study examined continuous symptom domains of general distress, anhedonia, and 
physiological hyperarousal according to the Tripartite Model. In addition, some 
methodological differences across experimental tasks limits direct comparisons across 
studies, such as mixed-block or valence conditions. Therefore, given the relative dearth 
of research in youth, future studies investigating deficits in attentional control in youth 
depression and anxiety are warranted.   
Translational Implications of Attentional Control Deficits  
 Findings and conclusions of the current study have important translational 
implications, especially for attention bias modification (ABM) interventions. ABM 
interventions are computer-based tasks designed to re-train attentional processing so as to 
reduce biased processing of negative emotional information, and therefore improve 
symptomatic functioning (e.g., Beevers, Clasen, Enock, & Schnyer, 2015). ABM tasks 
are typically adaptations of the visual probe task, with one important difference. Whereas 
in the original visual probe task, the probe stimulus replaces the emotional and neutral 
faces with equal frequency, in the ABM task, the probe stimulus replaces the neutral 
faces with a much greater frequency (e.g., 80%) compared to the emotional faces. 
Therefore, participants learn orienting towards the neutral face is more likely to facilitate 
a prompt behavioral response to the probe stimulus (Koster, Baert, Bockstaele, De Raedt, 
2010). Recent studies have shown that ABM is associated with reductions in symptoms 
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and stress reactivity, as well as improvements in connectivity between brain regions 
implicated in cognitive control (for a review, see Beevers et al., 2015).  
 More specifically, the findings of the current study have direct implications for 
the approach to training attentional processing. Some ABM paradigms, for instance, train 
participants to direct attention away from negative stimuli and towards neutral stimuli 
(e.g., Koster, Baert, Bockstaele, & De Raedt, 2010; Wells & Beevers, 2010), whereas 
other studies train participants to direct attention away from neutral stimuli and towards 
positive stimuli (e.g., Price, Greven, Siegle, Koster, & de Raedt, 2016). Therefore, the 
approach of these ABM paradigms is to train participants to direct their attention towards 
stimuli that are relevant in the context of current task goals (i.e., toward neutral or 
positive stimuli). Findings from the current study suggest that attentional control 
processes are particularly nuanced, and so the therapeutic target of ABM’s should 
precisely and directly match the specific components of attentional control that contribute 
to biased attention. Given that findings from the current study did not find evidence for 
difficulty directing attention to meet current task goals (e.g., no difference in time to first 
fixation for the target location or behavioral accuracy), it may be the case that focusing 
on this specific component of attentional control may not be the most relevant therapeutic 
target of ABM. Instead, ABM paradigms should train participants to inhibit prepotent 
tendencies to automatically orient towards salient emotional stimuli that are irrelevant or 
inappropriate in the context of current goals or demands. Such an approach would more 
precisely target and train the exact component of attentional control processes that is 
more closely associated with symptoms of psychopathology, such as general distress and 
physiological hyperarousal. In line with the approach to train inhibition of prepotent 
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attentional responses, some of the aforementioned studies have employed reward and 
punishment contingencies to shape attentional control in the context of non-emotional 
information (e.g., Hardin et al., 2007; Jazbec et al., 2005).  
Limitations and Future Directions  
 The current study had several limitations, which should also inform future 
directions for this important area of research. First, the current study operationalized 
constructs of the Tripartite Model, namely general distress, anhedonia, and physiological 
hyperarousal, by drawing upon specific items from self-report questionnaires assessing 
symptoms of depression (e.g., CDI, CES-DC) and anxiety (e.g., MASC, PSWQ-C). The 
current study selected scale items based on theory (e.g., Watson et al., 1995), as well as 
previous empirical studies (e.g., Chorpita et al., 1998, March et al., 1997). Although 
items from these self-report questionnaires were specifically designed to assess symptom 
dimensions of these disorders, there are some challenges in assigning symptom scale 
items to constructs of the Tripartite Model. For instance, items such as, “I felt lonely, like 
I didn't have any friends” from the CES-DC could have been assigned to the general 
distress construct, due to the mention of negative affect. Alternatively, this item could 
have been assigned to the anhedonia construct because it overlaps conceptually with 
social withdrawal. Future studies would benefit from utilizing scales that more closely 
index the three factors of the Tripartite Model, such as the Mood and Anxiety Symptom 
Questionnaire (Watson et al., 1995), the Positive and Negative Affectivity Scale for 
Children (Laurent et al., 1999), as well as scales of physiological hyperarousal (E.g. 
Laurent, Catanzaro, & Joiner, 1995). These scales were designed to precisely index 
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constructs of negative and positive affectivity, as well as physiological hyperarousal, and 
therefore could strengthen future studies that assess the factors of the Tripartite Model.  
 Second, the current study examined continuous symptom domains in a general 
community sample of youth and young adults, as the preponderance of research to date 
has used case-control designs comparing healthy controls to participants with DSM-
defined depression or anxiety disorders. It is possible, however, that low mean levels and 
variability in symptom severity in our unselected community sample might have limited 
the ability to detect effects between attentional processing and internalizing symptoms.  
 Third, the current study indexed attentional control processes only in the context 
of angry and neutral facial stimuli. Angry faces were chosen based on well-established 
theoretical associations of bias for indicators of social threat (i.e., anger) that cut across 
multiple forms of psychopathology, including depression and anxiety (Thayer, Åhs, 
Fredrikson, Sollers, & Wager, 2012). However, the current study was part of a larger 
study that required participants to complete laboratory tasks and questionnaires for five 
hours, and so only one emotional stimulus was chosen so as to limit the number of 
experimental trials and reduce undue burden on participants. Future studies would benefit 
from using multiple emotions, such as happiness, sadness, or fear, to determine how 
deficits in attentional control might vary across different types of emotions. This 
methodological approach would further strengthen observations regarding attentional 
control deficits in the context of various emotions and what is shared and unique across 
forms of internalizing psychopathology.   
 Future studies should examine whether attentional processing of emotional 
information is related to downstream cognitive emotion regulation processes, such as 
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rumination or cognitive reappraisal. Gross’ (2002) process model of emotion regulation 
maintains that attention exerts a relatively early impact on an unfolding emotional 
response. However, it is important to investigate the cognitive processes that may 
mediate or moderate the association between attentional processing of emotional 
information and the resulting emotional response. For example, Hilt, Leitzke, & Pollak 
(2016) found that greater dwell time on emotional faces in a modified visual probe task 
was associated with higher levels of rumination in a nonclinical sample of youth. 
Furthermore, Vanderhasselt, Koster, Goubert, and de Raedt (2012), found that reduced 
attentional control in the context of social threat interacted with life stress to predict 
prospective changes in rumination over a period of six weeks. Taken together, these 
studies provide some early evidence that deficits in attentional control may also be 
related to maladaptive downstream cognitive processes, especially rumination, which is a 
well-established and potentially more proximal cognitive mechanism of internalizing 
psychopathology.  
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Chapter Five: Summary 
 In conclusion, the current study makes an important contribution to the extant 
literature surrounding attentional processing of negative emotional information and 
internalizing psychopathology. More specifically, the results of the current study found 
that deficits inhibiting a reflexive prosaccade towards negative emotional stimuli, 
especially when it is irrelevant or inappropriate, is associated with what is shared across 
depression and anxiety, namely symptoms of general distress, as well as symptoms of 
physiological hyperarousal in anxiety. 
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Table 1 Questionnaire items for tripartite symptom constructs 
 Correlated Item Total Correlation  
on Constructs 
Questionnaire Item General Distress Anhedonia Physiological  
Hyperarousal 
MASC    
I feel tense or upset .532   
I feel restless or on edge .513   
PSWQ-C    
My worries really bother me .589   
I don’t really worry about things* .503   
Many things make me worry .699   
I know I shouldn’t worry about things, but I just can’t help it .763   
When I’m under pressure, I worry a lot .634   
I am always worrying about something .721   
I find it easy to stop worrying when I want* .566   
When I finish one thing, I start to worry about everything else .625   
I never worry about anything* .548   
I’ve been a worrier all my life .581   
I notice that I have been worrying about things .651   
Once I start worrying, I can’t stop .616   
I worry all the time .754   
I worry about things until they are all done .439   
CDI    
I am sad all of the time .515   
Nothing will ever work out for me .496   
I do everything wrong .535   
I think about bad things happening to me once in a while .437   
I hate myself .427   
All bad things are my fault .466   
I want to kill myself  .395   

















Things bother me all the time .606   
I cannot make up my mind about things .481   
I look ugly .499   
I have trouble sleeping every night .493   
I am tired all the time .456   
Most days I don’t feel like eating  .390   
I can never be as good as other kids  .387   
 
CES-DC 
   
I was bothered by things that usually don’t bother me .644   
I did not feel like eating, I wasn’t very hungry .513   
I felt like I was just as good as other kids* .448   
I felt down and unhappy  .718   
I felt like I was too tired to do things .530   
I felt scared .580   
I didn't sleep as well as I usually  .480   
I felt like crying .652   
I felt sad  .470   
CDI    
Nothing is fun at all  .727  
I do not want to be with people at all  .448  
I have to push myself all the time to do schoolwork   .395  
I feel alone all the time  .682  
I never have fun at school  .378  
I do not have any friends  .574  
Nobody really loves me   .359  
 
CES-DC 
   
I wasn't able to feel happy, even when family or friends tried to help me feel better  .655  
I felt like something good was going to happen*  .535  
I was happy*  .586  
I felt lonely, like I didn't have any friends  .696  
I felt like kids I know were not friendly or that they didn't want to be with me  .649  
I had a good time*  .669  
I felt people didn't like me  .689  






MASC    
I have trouble getting my breath   .552 
I get shaky or jittery   .709 
I get dizzy or faint feelings   .591 
I’m jumpy   .603 
I have pains in my chest   .558 
I feel strange, weird, or unreal   .594 
My heart races or skips beats   .641 
I feel sick to my stomach   .651 
My hands shake   .662 
My hands feel sweaty or cold    .446 
CDI Children’s Depression Inventory; CES-DC Center for Epidemiologic Studies-Depression Scale for Children MASC Multidimensional Anxiety 















Table 2 Means, standard deviations, and inter-correlations between all variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. CDI -               
2. CES-DC .873** -              
3. MASC .684** .686** -             
4. PSWQ-C .528** .543** .546** -            
5. GEN DISTRESS .800** .803** .685** .887** -           
6. ANHEDONIA .894** .935** .654** .423** .676** -          
7. PH AROUSAL .583** .617** .869** .537** .646** .542** -         
8. ACC PS -.047 -.128 .027 -.052 -.030 -.145 .062 -        
9. ACC AS -.001 -.006 -.007 -.004 .026 .037 .010 .478** -       
10. PROP ERR .057 .093 .119 .009 .071 .053 .069 -.058 .028 -      
11. T1STFIX PRO .056 .042 .119 .035 .091 .088 .098 -.481** -.030 -.029 -     
12. T1STFIX FACE -.193 -.179 -.294** -.211 -.258* -.185 -.321** .024 .016 -.173 -.023 -    
13. T1STFIX TAR .112 .123 -.079 .177 .177 .088 -.135 -.329** -.079 .003 .039 .034 -   
14. AGE -.082 -.080 -.190 .143 .081 -.059 -.179 .072 .315** -.056 -.047 .114 .011 -  
15. GENDER .240* .173 .154 .488** .462** .083 .161 .046 -.020 -.051 -.020 -.018 .097 .131 - 






Mean 7.83 12.66 29.91 17.59 29.75 7.05 8.25 .990 .930 .003 -.059 -.026 .014 16.76 1.57 
SD 7.74 10.55 15.38 9.64 17.13 6.66 6.08 .020 .077 .100 .591 .895 .947 2.39 .500 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
CDI Children’s Depression Inventory; CES-DC Center for Epidemiologic Studies-Depression Scale for Children MASC Multidimensional Anxiety 
Scale for Children; PSWQ-C Penn State Worry Questionnaire for Children; GEN DISTRESS Symptoms of general distress; ANHEDONIA Symptoms of 
anhedonia; PH AROUSAL Symptoms of physiological hyperarousal; ACC PS Proportion of correct responses in the prosaccade condition; ACC AS 
Proportion of correct responses in the antisaccade condition; PROP ERR Proportion of incorrect reflexive saccades in the antisaccade condition; 
T1STFIX PRO Time to first fixation for the facial cue in the prosaccade condition; T1STFIX FACE Time to first fixation for the facial cue in the 






















Table 3 Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for proportion of correct responses in the prosaccade condition (ACC PS) 
 General Distress Anhedonia Physiological Hyperarousal 
Variable B (SE) β t p ΔR2 B (SE) β t p ΔR2 B (SE) β t p ΔR2 
Step 1     .212     .005     .044 
   Gender .913 (.218) .452 4.19 .001  .121 (213) .070 .569 .571  .215 (.217) .116 .993 .324  
   Age .017 (.047) .039 .358 .721  -.015 (.045) -.040 -.327 .745  -.076 (.046) -.192 -1.65 .103  
Step 2      .001     .026     .005 
   Gender .916 (.220) .453 4.17 .001  .146 (.213) .084 .685 .496  .207 (.218) .111 .951 .345  
   Age .017 (.047) .039 .364 .717  -.013 (.045) -.034 -.278 .782  -.078 (.047) -.198 -1.69 .096  


















Table 4 Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for time to first fixation for the facial cue in the prosaccade condition (T1STFIX PRO) 
 General Distress Anhedonia Physiological Hyperarousal 
Variable B (SE) β t p ΔR2 B (SE) β t p ΔR2 B (SE) β t p ΔR2 
Step 1     .205     .009     .065 
   Gender .916 (.216) .451 4.25 .001  .147 (.222) .079 .662 .510  .374 (.229) .184 1.63 .106  
   Age .004 (.045) .010 .090 .928  -.025 (.046) -.064 -.538 .592  -.084 (.047) -.200 -1.78 .079  
Step 2      .014     .010     .009 
   Gender .926 (.215) .456 4.30 .001  .158 (.223) .085 .710 .480  .378 (.229) .186 1.65 .103  
   Age .006 (.044) .014 .135 .893  -.023 (.046) -.060 -.500 .619  -.082 (.048) -.195 -1.73 .088  




























Table 5 Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for proportion of incorrect reflexive saccades in the antisaccade condition (PROP ERR) 
 General Distress Anhedonia Physiological Hyperarousal 
Variable B (SE) β t p ΔR2 B (SE) β t p ΔR2 B (SE) β t p ΔR2 
Step 1     .208     .010     .065 
   Gender .915 (.212) .454 4.306 .001  .159 (.219) .086 .725 .471  .372 (.226) .184 1.65 .103  
   Age .004 (.044) .009 .089 .929  -.024 (.045) -.062 -.523 .603  -.084 (.047) -.201 -1.80 .076  
Step 2      .013     .004     .005 
   Gender .938 (.213) .466 4.403 .001  .172 (.221) .093 .093 .777 .440 .378 (.227) .187 1.67 .099  
   Age .003 (.044) .007 .070 .944  -.024 (.046) -.062 -.523 .602  -.083 (.047) -.197 -1.76 .083  




























Table 6 Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for time to first fixation for the facial cue in the antisaccade condition (T1STFIX FACE) 
 General Distress Anhedonia Physiological Hyperarousal 
Variable B (SE) β t p ΔR2 B (SE) β t p ΔR2 B (SE) β t p ΔR2 
Step 1     .218     .009     .060 
   Gender .929 (.212) .460 4.37 .001  .170 (.220) .092 .773 .442  .391 (.226) .195 1.73 .087  
   Age .016 (.045) .036 .345 .731  -.015 (.047) -.039 -.325 .746  -.072 (.048) -.167 -1.49 .141  
Step 2      .068     .034     .089 
   Gender .904 (.205) .448 4.42 .001  .150 (.218) .081 .687 .495  .363 (.216) .181 1.68 .098  
   Age .031 (.044) .072 .705 .483  -.006 (.047) -.015 -.129 .898  -.057 (.046) -.134 -1.24 .220  




























Table 7 Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for proportion of correct responses in the antisaccade condition (ACC AS) 
 General Distress Anhedonia Physiological Hyperarousal 
Variable B (SE) β t p ΔR2 B (SE) β t p ΔR2 B (SE) β t p ΔR2 
Step 1     .212     .005     .044 
   Gender .913 (.218) .452 4.19 .001  .121 (.213) .070 .569 .571  .215 (.217) .116 .993 .324  
   Age .017 (.047) .039 .358 .721  -.015 (.045) -.040 -.327 .745  -.076 (.046) -.192 -1.65 .103  
Step 2      .003     .002     .006 
   Gender .925 (.220) .458 4.20 .001  .127 (.215) .073 .588 .588  .228 (.218) .123 1.05 .299  
   Age .009 (.049) .021 .183 .855  -.020 (.048) -.054 -.416 .679  -.087 (.049) -.218 -1.78 .080  




























Table 8 Summary of hierarchical regression analysis for time to first fixation for the target location in the antisaccade condition (T1STFIX 
 TAR) 
 General Distress Anhedonia Physiological Hyperarousal 
Variable B (SE) β t p ΔR2 B (SE) β t p ΔR2 B (SE) β t p ΔR2 
Step 1     .186     .010     .065 
   Gender .915 (.212) .454 4.31 .001  .159 (.219) .086 .725 .471  .372 (.226) .184 1.65 .103  
   Age .004 (.044) .009 .089 .929  -.024 (.045) -.062 -.523 .603  -.084 (.047) -.210 -1.80 .076  
Step 2      .007     .011     .023 
   Gender .891 (.212) .443 4.19 .001  .151 (.220) .082 .687 .495  .390 (.225) .193 1.74 .087  
   Age .002 (.044) .005 .049 .961  -.024 .045 -.063 -.532 .596 -.087 (.047) -.206 -1.85 .068  































Figure 3 Time to first fixation for the facial cue in the antisaccade condition (T1STFIX FACE) is negatively correlated with General Distress 








Figure 4 Time to first fixation for the facial cue in the antisaccade condition (T1STFIX FACE) is negatively correlated with Physiological 
 Hyperarousal (PH AROUSAL). 
 
